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THE ORIGINS OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE AND PROFESSIONAL SECRET
by
Daniel W. Shuman*
HE need for personal privacy in communications and the need for
probative evidence at trials are like separate melodies within the same
musical composition. Each has a distinctive appeal, yet there comes
a time in society, as in the composition, foroa counterpoint or resolution of
these independent themes within the fabric of a single work. That resolution
has taken many forms. Some legal systems have concluded that the receipt
of probative evidence at trials is more important than personal privacy in
communications and, therefore, compel disclosure of private communica-
tions. Other legal systems reflect a balance in which personal privacy is
more important than probative evidence at trials and, thus, prohibit disclo-
sure of private communications. Still other legal systems have evolved a
patchwork of rules and exceptions favoring privacy in one situation and pro-
bative evidence in another.I
That different legal systems have reached different conclusions on this
complex question is not at all surprising. The failure of the decisionmakers
to examine the origins of their choice of the proper balance and the conse-
quences of that choice, however, is surprising.2 This Article examines the
* B.S., J.D., University of Arizona. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
This Article had its genesis in a speech I gave at the Sixth World Congress on Medical Law
in Ghent, Belgium, August 23, 1982. Research on this Article was assisted by Catherine
Farlow and Andrew Ragusin, former students at Southern Methodist University School of
Law. In addition, I have benefited from the comments of numerous colleagues from around
the world whose advice I did not always follow: Bartha Knoppers, Jonathan Erlen, J. Gilis-
sen, H.J.J. Leenan, Alain Andr6 Levasseur, Joseph W. McKnight, Philip M. Teigen, and My-
ron Weiner.
1. Privilege, professional secret, confidentiality, secrecy, and privacy are words used to
describe relationships within which certain communications are sometimes protected from dis-
closure. These terms will be used throughout this Article. Privilege is the common law term
for a rule favoring privacy over probative evidence and professional secret is its civil law coun-
terpart. Privilege and professional secret are not, however, different words describing the same
thing as these doctrines differ substantially in their application.
Confidentiality is the ethical duty of the professional, operating outside of the judicial set-
ting, not to disclose confidential communications made by the patient or client. Secrecy is the
expectation that a communication will not be disclosed. Privacy is the ability to control reve-
lation of information about oneself.
2. I am not the first to call for a more careful examination of the origins of privilege.
Professor David Louisell was an outspoken critic of the contemporary analysis of this question
who urged a similar reexamination. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformityr I Confusion: Priv-
ileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101 (1956).
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origins of the choice of the proper balance between privacy and probative
evidence from the perspective of the physician-patient relationship and
traces its roots in common and civil law systems.3
The physician-patient relationship constitutes an interesting framework
for studying the conflict between the need for privacy in communications
and the need for probative evidence at trials for several reasons: (1) the
stakes in the outcome-ineffective medical care that endangers life or limb
versus inaccurate judicial decisions that put life, liberty, or property at risk;
(2) the ferocity of argument by each side of this conflict; and (3) the mark-
edly different ways in which various legal systems have resolved this same
problem. The study of the origins of privilege and professional secret is criti-
cally important because contemporary American legal analysis has failed to
recognize the historical bases for these doctrines. This failure was perhaps
best identified by Professor David Louisell:
It is my opinion that the current analysis of the privileges is unsatisfac-
tory and is contributing to confusion in judicial opinions. . . . [M]uch
more extensive and thorough study in comparative law should be un-
dertaken, including Roman, Canonical and European law; I think the
eastern legal traditions also should not be neglected. Such study should
be directed not only to the problem of the extent of recognition of the
privileges in each country, but also to the question of the ultimate his-
torical roots and precise rationale of each privilege. Indeed, so far as I
know, this latter type of inquiry has not yet adequately been performed
even in our own common law area.4
Courts and legislatures in this country that choose to recognize or limit
privilege do not, as they often assume, write on a blank slate. Other legal
systems with histories much older than our own have wrestled with this
same conflict between privacy and the need for probative evidence. The ex-
perience of these other legal systems is important, among other things, as a
vehicle for learning of alternative approaches to this problem and for testing
various assumptions upon which our own approaches rest.
I. THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
A. The Conflict in Policies
Judicial proceedings frequently require accurate knowledge of some past
event to decide correctly an issue involving the potential loss of life, liberty,
or property.5 Since the event at issue has already occurred and some knowl-
edge of it has been irrevocably lost, the decisionmaker cannot possibly deter-
mine what occurred in the past to a one hundred percent degree of certainty.
At best the decisionmaker might expect to learn what probably happened,
3. Elsewhere, I have begun an examination of this choice and its consequences from an
empirical perspective in the context of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See Shuman &
Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privi-
lege, 60 N.C.L. REv. 893 (1982); Weiner & Shuman, The Privilege Study, 40 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 1027 (1983).
4. Louisell, supra note 2, at 101.
5. Shuman & Weiner, supra note 3, at 904.
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and the probability that the decisionmaker will accurately find the facts in-
creases as more relevant evidence is received. Rational systems of evidence,
therefore, are structured to accept all relevant evidence in the absence of a
strong policy justifying exclusion. 6
One policy that has been advanced to justify the exclusion of relevant evi-
dence is the protection of certain important relationships and the values un-
derlying those relationships through a privilege or professional secret. A
privilege or professional secret permits its holder to prevent the discovery or
introduction in judicial proceedings of confidential relational communica-
tions. Because this privilege may result in the exclusion of highly probative
evidence, the policy underlying it presents a potential conflict with the policy
of judicial proceedings to resolve disputes accurately. 7
The analytical approaches taken to resolve this conflict tend to fall into
two different schools: the utilitarian or instrumental school and the deonto-
logical or humanistic school. 8 The utilitarian approach to privilege is repre-
sented by the views of Dean Wigmore. Wigmore viewed privileges as
obstructions to the truthfinding process that must be justified by their benefit
to an important relationship. He thus imposed four requirements for recog-
nition of a relational privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
for the correct disposal of litigation.9
This utilitarian approach, which considers the utility of a privilege to the
relationship it seeks to protect and the relationship's value to society, raises
empirical questions: Does the relationship originate in a confidence that
communications will not be disclosed; is confidentiality essential to the ful-
fillment of the relationship? Thus, portions of the utilitarian arguments for
privilege are, at least in theory, subject to empirical validation.
6. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 530
(1898).
7. The United States Supreme Court recognized this conflict in Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1980). In that case the Court affirmed several of its prior
statements:
Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental prin-
ciple that " 'the public.., has a right to every man's evidence.' " [United
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).] As such, they must be strictly con-
strued and accepted "only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to
testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the nor-
mally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining
truth." [Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting); accord United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-710 (1974).]
8. See 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 201, at 416-17 (1978); C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5422, at 670-72 (1980).
9. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527 (J. McNaughten rev. ed. 1961).
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The deontological approach to privilege, which often relies upon writings
of Professor David Louisell, views privilege as a protection of "significant
human values in the interest of the holders of the privileges and. . . the fact
that the existence of these guarantees sometimes results in the exclusion
from a trial of probative evidence is merely a secondary and incidental fea-
ture of the privileges' vitality."10 This school of thought focuses on the im-
portance of the societal values ensconced within a privilege, arguing that
disclosure of confidences revealed in certain relationships is of itself wrong.1 I
Proponents of the deontological view contend that recognition of a privilege
requires only a choice between competing values and is not subject to empir-
ical examination. 12
The utilitarian argument in favor of a physician-patient privilege is that
the privilege is necessary to permit the patient to develop confidence in the
physician so that a candid revelation of all the facts necessary for accurate
diagnosis and appropriate treatment will occur. 13 Unless patients are certain
that physicians cannot be compelled to disclose confidences, patients either
will not seek medical care or will not reveal to their physicians all the infor-
mation necessary for effective treatment. This argument assumes not only
that the patient is aware of the applicable law of privilege and considers that
law before consulting with a physician, but also that the patient would avoid
treatment or withhold information necessary for effective treatment in the
absence of a privilege.
Few seriously contend that these assumptions accurately reflect patient
decision-making behavior in the case of physical problems.14 Opponents of
the patient-physician privilege claim that people are not so shy or embar-
rassed about their medical problems that they avoid needed medical care in
10. Louisell, supra note 2, at 101; see also Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before
the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 240 (1973), reprinted in Black, The Marital and Physician Privi-
leges-A Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45, 46-52 (impassioned
statement that privacy concerns demand recognition of physician privilege); Krattenmaker,
Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 85-94 (1973) (discussion of privacy as basis for testimonial privileges);
Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597, 605-12
(1980) (discussing privacy as opposed to utility as basis for attorney-client privilege).
11. See Shuman & Weiner, supra note 3, at 906.
12. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 671.
13. From the utilitarian point of view the privilege must exist:
to evoke and encourage the utmost confidence between the patient and his phy-
sician and to preserve it inviolate, so that the patient will freely and frankly
reveal to his physician all of the facts, circumstances and symptoms of his mal-
ady or injury, or lay bare his body for examination, and thus enable his physi-
cian to make a correct diagnosis of his condition and treat him more safely and
efficaciously.
C. DEWITT, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 27 (1958)
(footnotes omitted). This argument was first made in the American Medical Association's
1847 Code of Ethics. C. LEAKE, PERCIVAL'S MEDICAL ETHICS 219-20, 222-23 (1927).
14. The nature of contemporary medicine with third-party reimbursement and participa-
tion of specialists and allied health professionals belies any reasonable expectation that confi-
dentiality exists in medicine. Siegler, Confidentiality in Medicine-A Decrepit Concept, 307
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1518, 1518-19 (1982).
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the absence of a privilege. 5 Nor, claim the opponents, does any evidence
exist that patients know about privilege laws or receive more effective medi-
cal care following the enactment of a privilege.
No empirical evidence concerning these assumptions has been presented
by either the proponents or opponents of the physician-patient privilege.
This fact, according to the utilitarian school of thought, should result in
rejection of the physician-patient privilege, for the privilege should only be
recognized if it is demonstrably necessary to protect an important relation-
ship. Since the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to recognition of
the privilege, is in equipoise, proponents of the privilege have not satisfied
the burden imposed upon them by the utilitarians.
The deontological argument in favor of the physician-patient privilege is
that society should recognize the dignity of the individual by protecting the
extremely personal physician-patient relationship from unnecessary intru-
sions. 16 Disclosure is wrong, not because people will refrain from seeking
15. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2380a, at 829; Chafee, Privileged Communications:
Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE
L.J. 607, 609 (1943); Ladd, A Modern Code of Evidence, 27 IOWA L. REV. 213, 224-25 (1941-
1942); Long, The Physician-Patient Privilege Statutes Obstruct Justice, 25 INS. COUNS. J. 224,
224-25 (1958); Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of
Evidence, 10 U. CHI. L. REV. 285, 290 (1942); Purrington, An Abused Privilege, 6 COLUM. L.
REV. 388, 396 (1906).
Although utilitarian scrutiny of the physician-patient privilege in the literature has been
harsh, the commentators have been more favorably disposed towards a psychotherapist-patient
privilege. Within the psychotherapist-patient relationship "[i]t is assumed that unless patients
are assured that their communications on sensitive and potentially embarrassing subjects will
be kept inviolate, no effective therapy for mental or emotional problems will occur." Shuman
& Weiner, supra note 3, at 894. Yet, even in this case the privilege appears to have less influ-
ence on patient behavior than the privilege's proponents contend. Id. at 924-25.
16. Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege (part 2), 8 VILL. L. REV.
447, 480 (1963). An eloquent and impassioned plea utilizing this theory in support of a physi-
cian-patient privilege in the Federal Rules of Evidence was given by Professor Charles Black of
the Yale Law School.
Hardly less grave is the invasion of central human privacy involved in the root-
and-branch abolition of the physician-patient privilege. The question here is not
only whether people might be discouraged from making full communication to
physicians, though it seems flatly impossible that this would not sometimes hap-
pen-a consideration which would in itself be enough to make incomprehensible
the absolute subordination of this privacy interest to any trivial interest arising
in litigation. But evaluation of a rule like this entails not only a guess as to what
conduct it will motivate, but also an estimate of its intrinsic decency. All of us
would consider it indecent for a doctor, in the course, say, of a television inter-
view, or even in a textbook, to tell all he knows, naming names, about patients
who have been treated by him. Why does this judgment of decency altogether
vanish from sight, sink to absolute zero, as soon as somebody files any kind of
nondemurrable complaint in a federal court? Here, again, can a rule be a good
one when the ethical doctor must violate it, or hedge, or evade?
In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the late Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
for the Court, condemned as utterly indecent the forced pumping of a man's
stomach to get criminal evidence. Does not the forced revealing of every medi-
cal and personal fact, stomach contents and all, learned by the doctor of a per-
son not even suspected of anything, just to serve the convenience of any litigant,
partake at least a little of the same indecency? Do not these and many other
considerations lead to the discernment of constitutional as well as of policy is-
sues here? If so, then the same remarks as those made above apply to the pos-
19851
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medical care, but because society thereby intrudes upon the physician-pa-
tient relationship. The privilege represents to the deontologist a complete
right to privacy in certain relationships. 17 Thus, on the surface, recognition
of a physician-patient privilege on this basis requires a value judgment:
Should a society completely reject intrusion into the sanctity of the physi-
cian-patient relationship? This judgment does not appear subject to empiri-
cal scrutiny, but instead seems to turn on personal beliefs about the
appropriate relationship between society and the individual.
This choice, however, is not entirely free from empirical underpinnings.
Why should society reject any intrusion into the sanctity of the physician-
patient relationship and the resulting communications? What is the value of
privacy? According to one highly regarded authority on the subject of pri-
vacy, we should value privacy because it is an essential ingredient of a demo-
cratic society.18 Acceptance of this thesis requires more than a belief that
democracy is a desirable form of government since the thesis posits a causal
relationship between privacy and democracy. Does more privacy result in
better democracy? Must privacy be absolute to assure the purest
democracy?
Few, if any, of the deontological proponents of a physician-patient privi-
ture in which those constitutional issues are put by the promulgation of these
Rules.
Black, supra note 10, at 49-51.
17. Professor David Louisell explained that "[p]rimarily they [privileges] are a right to be
let alone, a right to unfettered freedom, in certain narrowly prescribed relationships, from the
state's coercive or supervisory powers and from the nuisance of its eavesdropping." Louisell,
supra note 2, at 110-11.
18. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 32 (1967). Westin argues that in the absence of
"personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation, and limited and protected communica-
tion," each of which requires privacy, democracy cannot exist. Id. at 32, 33-39; see also S.
BOK, SECRETS 26-28 (1982) (in-depth work exploring the ethics of secrecy); Fried, Privacy, 77
YALE L.J. 475 (1968) (discussion of privacy as an aspect of social order). Not all students of
privacy agree, however, that it is essential to a healthy individual or democratic society. Crit-
ics point to primitive societies in which little or no privacy exists, yet individuals are emotion-
ally healthy and the society democratic. Illustrative of these societies are the Samoans studied
by Margaret Mead who have no privacy for sleeping, dressing, bathing, excretory functions,
birth, or death. M. MEAD, COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA 20 (1928); see also Bettelheim, The
Right to Privacy is a Myth, SAT. EVENING POST, July 27, 1968, at 8 (discussion of positive
aspects of lack of privacy). The notion that privacy is required for a healthy democratic soci-
ety is undercut somewhat by experience closer to home. Privacy in our own society has not
been physically possible until relatively recently. Ironically, the technological advances that
have made privacy possible have brought new threats to privacy as well. Ruebhausen & Brim,
Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1184, 1185 (1965).
Nevertheless, although physical privacy such as a room of one's own has not been possible
until relatively recently, most vertebrates and many behaviorally advanced invertebrates ob-
serve well-defined social spacing rules that, in part, define the compromise between attraction
and repulsion of members of the same species. E. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYN-
THESIS 256-57 (1975).
From another perspective, an attempt to avoid disclosure is thought to imply questionable
behavior, an escape from the responsibility of public action. Friedrich, Secrecy Versus Privacy:
The Democratic Dilemma, in NoMoS XIII 106-07 (1971). Avoiding criticism through secrecy
prevents thorough examination of thoughts and beliefs. S. BOK, supra, at 25. Thus, rather




lege contend that privacy in the relationship should be absolute. 19 The pro-
tection of the public from incompetent physicians, the prevention of harm
that the patient has threatened to third persons or the correct adjudication of
child custody questions all suggest considerations that may, even to the de-
ontological proponents of a physician-patient privilege, outweigh privacy
concerns in certain instances. How should this balance be struck? In part
the answer to the question turns upon empirical considerations: Can physi-
cian incompetency be effectively policed without resort to privileged infor-
mation; can physicians make accurate predictions of their patients' future
dangerousness; how will the loss of privacy affect the accuracy of the child
custody adjudication? These questions are subject to empirical research, 20
but deontological proponents of the physician-patient privilege do not take
this possibility into account.
B. The Legal Responses
1. Roman Law
The earliest reference to any relational privilege or professional secret in
contemporary literature is the refusal of Roman law to compel the testimony
of an attorney against a client during the pendency of the case. 21 This re-
fusal of testimony seems to relate to the attorney's role as a servant, obliged
to keep his master's secrets. 22 Just as a slave could not testify against a
master because the slave was a part of the family and, therefore, a party to
its mutual fidelity, so the attorney had a similar moral duty, which the law
recognized. 23 In addition, Roman law refused testimony offered by the at-
torney on behalf of the client based on the motive to falsify testimony. 24 The
Roman rule barring testimony of attorneys, therefore, incorporated what we
now call a relational privilege and a rule of incompetence. 25 The rationale
for this relational privilege appears to be deontological: for society to com-
pel a citizen to divulge a secret and thereby breach a moral duty is wrong.
19. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 10, at 602.
20. To demonstrate that these are questions subject to empirical research, consider the
following hypothetical study. One might conduct an empirical study reviewing the evidence
used in physician disciplinary proceedings in a state that has effectively policed physician in-
competency. In what percentage of cases did otherwise privileged information play a signifi-
cant factor in the decision? Could this information have been gleaned from alternative,
nonprivileged sources? Are there particular classes of physician problems that are only prova-
ble through privileged sources?
21. Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16
CALIF. L. REV. 487, 488 (1928).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 488-89. Originally only testimony of a slave against his master was excluded.
W. BUCKLAND, THE ROMAN LAW OF SLAVERY 88 (reprint of 1908 ed. 1969). By the third
century A.D., such testimony was excluded whether offered for or against the master. Excep-
tions were made in certain cases such as corruption of vestal virgins, adultery, and coinage
offenses. Id. at 89-90.
24. Radin, supra note 21, at 488.
25. Roman law excluded the parties to a case from testifying as another aspect of the rules




Chronologically, the next reference to any relational privilege or profes-
sional secret is found in the early Middle Ages when continental European
codes excused and occasionally prohibited testimony from the clergy.26 This
restriction has its origin in secular recognition of the seal of confession and
canon law. 27  Although confession during the third century occurred in
front of the entire congregation, by the fifth century the Church had stopped
its practice of public confession and instituted private confession. 28 The seal
of confession was viewed as absolute, and betrayal by the father confessor
was impermissible. The seal of confession existed to avoid the risk of prose-
cution for crimes or humiliation that would deter confessions in the absence
of the seal.29 Canon law provided for the dismissal of a priest who divulged
what he learned by hearing confession.30 In some instances a greater sanc-
tion was extracted. Consider the following:
At Toulouse, in 1579, an innkeeper murdered a guest and buried the
body in the cellar: he confessed the crime to a priest who, seduced by a
reward offered from the detection of the murderer, denounced the crim-
inal to the magistrates; under torture the culprit confessed the crime,
adding that no one but the confessor could have betrayed him; an inves-
tigation ensued, which resulted in the Parlement of Toulouse releasing
the criminal and hanging the priest, after he had been degraded by the
26. 1 S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 247, at 289 n.l (13th ed.
1876).
27. Canon law developed as the exclusive law governing disputes among members of the
early Christian church, although governmental recognition did not occur until the ninth cen-
tury. G. ESPINAY, De l'Influence Du Droit Canonique sur le Ddveloppment de la Procddure
Civile et Criminelle, in REVUE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRANCAIS ET ETRANGER, Tome II,
503-05 (Ire S6rie 1856). Canon law fostered the development of privileges through the use of
an adversary system and a requirement that judgments be based on legally admissible evidence.
Id.
28. W. TIEMAN, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE: PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND THE
PASTOR 30-31 (1964); see 1 H. LEA, A HISTORY OF AURICULAR CONFESSION AND INDUL-
GENCES IN THE LATIN CHURCH 415-17 (1896).
29. H. LEA, supra note 28, at 415; R. NAZ, TRAITE DE DROIT CANONIQUE, Tome II,
Livre III, Des Sacraments (2d ed. Letourzey, Paris 1954). In support of this position St.
Thomas Aquinas maintained that "the priest should conform himself to God, of whom he is
the minister, and as God does not reveal the sins made known to him in confession, so the
priest should be equally reticent." H. LEA, supra note 28, at 412.
30. Armenian and Syrian Canons in the sixth century A.D. provided for dismissal of
priests breaching the seal of confession. Canon 18 of Verses II of Achtarak, 548-557 A.D., in
DISCIPLINIA ANTIOCHENA ANTICA 213 (P. Hinda ed. Sira, Vatican 1941). Canon 22, which
also provided for dismissal, was incorporated into the Canon Law Compilation of Anselm of
Lucca (11 th Century) and later into the Decree of Gratian. Gratian, Dist. VI, De Paenit., C2.
To this penalty, life imprisonment in a convent was added by the Council of Lateran of 1215.
Decr., IV., T. XXXVIII, C-12.
Canons 889, 890, and 2369 of the Canon Law Code of 1917, which flow from the Council of
Lateran, are the present-day Church law applicable to this subject. Canon 889 prohibits any
breach of the seal of confession. Canon 890 prohibits the priest from using knowledge ac-
quired at confession even absent disclosure of the secret itself. Canon 2369 imposes criminal
sanctions and excommunication for violation of Canon 889. R. NAZ, TRAITE DE DROIT CA-




With the exception of crimes or conspiracies against the king and his fam-
ily, ancient French caselaw recognized this fundamental tenet of Catholi-
cism and did not permit the priest to violate the seal of the confession by
testifying.32 Furthermore, although the French monarchy law33 did not
generally impose criminal sanctions for breach of professional secret, the law
did impose criminal sanctions in the case of violation of the seal of
confession.
The Concordat in 1801 between the Catholic Pope and the French Em-
peror Napoleon provided for the establishment, respect, and free exercise of
Catholicism in France. Because of the role of confession in the Catholic
Church, French judges were required to respect and enforce the seal of the
confession without exception. 34 Consistent with a deontological rationale
for privilege, intrusion by the state upon this tenet of Catholicism was
viewed as improper.
3. Common Law
The modes of trial at common law in England prior to the fifteenth cen-
tury did not suggest the need for relational privileges. They included trial by
oath or oath helpers, trial by ordeal, trial by battle, and trial by witnesses.3 5
Even in the case of trial by witnesses, jurors did not hear evidence so much
as they reached conclusions based upon their prior knowledge of the case as
members of the community. 36 Indeed, procedures for compelling testimony
of nonparties did not generally exist. A witness who volunteered testimony
was viewed as an unwanted intermeddler and subjected to suit for mainte-
nance, a common law tort for stirring up litigation.37 Gradually, the com-
mon law trial process changed. During the period 1450-1460 equity courts
recognized a subpoena that the Chancellor might issue on behalf of the
plaintiff to a nonparty witness. 38 A similar change did not occur in law
courts until the sixteenth century. In 1562-1563 the Statute of Elizabeth
abolished suit for maintenance against a witness and authorized penalties for
a witness's refusal to testify after service of process and tender of expenses.39
With the risk of compelled testimony came the need to examine the concept
of privilege.
The first privilege to spring forth following the risk of testimonial compul-
31. H. LEA, supra note 28, at 455 (footnote omitted). This incident may be one of the first
reported instances of the exclusionary rule.
32. C. PfN. ANNOT. art. 378, Tome I, Livre III (annotated by E. Garqon, Sirey, Paris
1901-06).
33. The term "monarchy law" is used to refer to the exercise of royal power. See R.
DAVID, FRENCH LAW 8-11 (1972).
34. See Nov. 30, 1810, Cass. Crim. Ire, Fr., 1791-1830 S. Jur. I.
35. J. THAYER, supra note 6, at 16.
36. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2190, at 62; see J. THAYER, supra note 6, at 47-48, 90-
93.
37. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2190, at 63-64; J. THAYER, supra note 6, at 126-29.
38. J. THAYER, supra note 6, at 129.
39. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2190, at 65.
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sion was the attorney-client privilege. 4" Wigmore concludes that the attor-
ney-client privilege was recognized in the reign of Elizabeth I and cites cases
that follow closely on the heels of the Statute of Elizabeth. 41 Other sources
refer to Wigmore's dating of the privilege and cite no earlier cases recogniz-
ing an attorney-client privilege. 42
Did the common law's recognition of an attorney-client privilege spring
forth independent of Roman law and its earlier recognition of an attorney-
client privilege? One can answer this question, if at all, only through edu-
cated guesswork. 43 Although the Roman Empire included the territory now
constituting England, Roman jurisprudence did not survive as a dominant
influence on Anglo-Saxon laws.44 English law did, however, borrow from
Roman law.45 The development of equity, for example, is thought to be
based on the Roman aequitas.4 6 English law also incorporated principles of
40. Id. § 2290, at 542-43. In Medieval England prior to the reign of Henry VIII the law
of the Roman Church and the law of England were so intertwined that the seal of the confes-
sion functioned as a priest-penitent privilege. See Hogan, A Modern Problem on the Privilege
of the Confessional, 6 Loy. L. REV. 1, 8 (1951-1952). Following Henry VIII's break with the
Roman Church a priest-penitent privilege was rejected by English courts, and contemporary
sources now typically state that the common law did not recognize a priest-penitent privilege.
See id. at 2, 13.
41. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2290, at 542 n. 1. Wigmore cited and analyzed the
cases as follows:
Berd v. Lovelace, Cary 88, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch. 1577) (solicitor exempted from
examination touching the cause); Dennis v. Codrington, Cary 143, 21 Eng. Rep.
53 (Ch. 1580) (on a motion to examine one Oldsworth, "touching a matter in
variance, wherein he hath been of Counsel, it is ordered he shall not be com-
pelled by subpoena or otherwise to be examined upon any matter concerning the
same, wherein he the said Mr. Oldsworth was of counsel, either by the indiffer-
ent choice of both parties or with either of them by reason of any annuity or
fee"); Kelway v. Kelway, Cary 127, 21 Eng. Rep. 47 (Ch. 1580) (solicitor of
plaintiff to be examined for defendant, "upon any interrogatory which shall not
be touching the secrecy of the title or of any other matter which he knoweth as
solicitor only"); Onbie's Case, March N.C. 83, pl. 136, 82 Eng. Rep. 422 (K.B.
1642) ("a lawyer who was of counsel may be examined upon oath as to the
matter of agreement, not to the validity of an assurance, or to matter of coun-
sel"); Roll, C.J., in Waldron v. Ward, Sty. 449, 82 Eng. Rep. 853 (K.B. 1654)
("He is not bound to make answer for things which may disclose the secrets of
his clyent's cause"); Sparke v. Middleton, 1 Kebl. 505, 83 Eng. Rep. 1079 (K.B.
1664) (counsel required in testifying to tell only "such things as he either knew
before he was of counsel or that came to his knowledge since by other persons");
Legard v. Foot, Rep. t. Finch 82, 23 Eng. Rep. 44 (Ch. 1673) (attorney privi-
leged); Anonymous, Skin. 404, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B. 1693) (counsel
privileged).
42. See, e.g., W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 204 n.2 (3d ed. Lawyer's
ed. 1984); J. PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 426, at 440 (9th ed. 1964). Professor
Hazard questions whether acceptance of the attorney-client privilege was firmly rooted as early
as Wigmore suggests. Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66
CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1070 (1978). According to Hazard's analysis of the early cases, recogni-
tion of the attorney-client privilege was at first viewed with much skepticism, only hesitantly
accepted until the nineteenth century, and thereafter subject to exceptions for crimes and
wrongdoing by the client. See id. at 1070-87.
43. Radin, supra note 21, at 489.
44. F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 5 (1926).
45. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 491 (5th ed. 1942).
46. 1 J. Scor, LAW, THE STATE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 257 (1939).
Scott defines aequitas as essentially the same as the Law of Nature. Id.
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the Roman law of slavery, 47 from which the Roman attorney-client privilege
traces its roots. 48 Although the earliest English cases recognizing an attor-
ney-client privilege make no reference to Roman law or any other body of
law as a basis for decision, the English jurists who decided those cases had
ample opportunity to read and be influenced by Roman jurisprudence.
The decline in the importance of Canon law following the Reformation
resulted in English law becoming more receptive to Roman law.49 This pe-
riod of increased receptivity coincides with the earliest recorded recognition
of an attorney-client privilege in English law. Indeed, Berd v. Lovelace,50 the
1577 decision cited by Wigmore as the earliest case recognizing an attorney-
client privilege, was a decision of the Court of Chancery, which administered
the English system of equity based on Roman law.
Most authors conclude that the common law rationale for the attorney-
client privilege initially was a "point of honor" 5' that gentlemen do not re-
veal secrets entrusted to them. With the shift in the factual orientation of
trials, this basis for recognition of a privilege did not prevail for long. The
adequacy of honor as a basis for refusing to give testimony was rejected
along with a common law physician-patient privilege in 1776 in the famous
Duchess of Kingston's Case.52 The Duchess was tried for bigamy before the
House of Lords. The Crown sought to compel the testimony of Hawkins,
her physician, that she had admitted to him the existence of an earlier mar-
riage. Hawkins responded, "I do not know how far any thing that has come
before me in a confidential trust in my profession should be disclosed, consis-
tent with my professional honour."' 53 To this Lord Mansfield, in what is
now oft-quoted language, replied:
If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure he would
be guilty of a breach of honour and of great indiscretion; but, to give
that information in a court of justice, which by the law of the land he is
bound to do, will never be imputed to him as any indiscretion
whatever. 54
That the first known physician-patient privilege decision in English law
did not occur until two hundred years after the first known attorney-client
privilege decision is curious. This occurrence might be explained in several
ways. First, because of the existing state of medical science, physicians may
not have been a reliable source of evidence. Second, attorneys may have
47. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 45, at 491.
48. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
49. W. WINDEYER, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 182-83 (2d ed. 1949).
50. Cary 88, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch. 1577).
51. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2290, at 543; 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 202 (3d ed. 1944).
52. Rex. v. Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 572-73 (1776).
53. Id. at 572.
54. Id. at 573 (footnotes omitted). Even if a physician-patient privilege had been recog-
nized in this case, the communications for which disclosure was sought might not have come
within its protection. The privilege, when recognized, protects only information reasonably
necessary to secure medical care. Hawkins's testimony related to delivering a child of the




assumed that physicians should not or could not be compelled to disclose
confidential patient communications, and thus may not have requested such
information. Third, attorneys may have assumed that physicians could be
compelled to disclose confidential communications, and thus may not have
objected to requests for such disclosure. Fourth, courts may have addressed
this question prior to 1776 in decisions that remain undiscovered. The plau-
sibility of each of these explanations is explored in the following paragraphs.
Was medical science likely to be of assistance to courts in the sixteenth
and seventeenth century? Although the modem scientific method took hold
in the seventeenth century, science still coexisted with a belief in sorcery,
witchcraft, and astrology. 5  Thus, for example, wounds were frequently
treated with "weapon salves" and "sympathy powders," cures in which the
physician administered a salve to the weapon that had caused the wound.56
The state of medical science revealed by this procedure suggests that medical
testimony would be of limited assistance to courts. The question, however,
is not whether medical testimony would help, but whether people believed it
would help. No doubt in two hundred years medical historians will look
incredulously at some medical testimony currently received into evidence.
Just as this testimony is accepted as beneficial now, so people utilized medi-
cal testimony in trials prior to the eighteenth century in the apparent belief
that such testimony was beneficial then.
During the seventeenth century medical testimony regarding the cause of
death was received into evidence in criminal trials.57 Furthermore, in addi-
tion to the humdrum proceedings that allowed medical testimony, seven-
teenth century witchcraft trials permitted the introduction of medical
testimony. 58 For example, in a 1662 English witchcraft trial two types of
medical testimony were received. One physician testified as an expert that in
his opinion the activities of the defendants were the work of witches. 59 An-
other physician, who had treated a child cared for by one of the "witches,"
testified regarding the treatment he had prescribed for the child. 60 Thus,
whatever its actual or perceived benefit, medical testimony was received by
English courts at least one hundred years prior to the Duchess of Kingston's
Case.61
55. Klein, The History of Medicine in Tudor Times: An Histographical Survey, 33 THE
HISTORIAN 365, 374 (1971).
56. L. ZIMMERMAN & I. VEITH, GREAT IDEAS IN THE HISTORY OF SURGERY 258
(1961); see Klein, supra note 55.
57. F. BIRKENHEAD, FAMOUS TRIALS OF HISTORY 66, 71, 95-99 (1926). There is evi-
dence that medical malpractice cases were litigated in English courts at least as early as the
fourteenth century. Post, Doctor versus Patient: Two Fourteenth Century Lawsuits, 16 MED.
HIST. 296, 296-300 (1972).
58. Geis & Bunn, Sir Thomas Browne and Witchcraft: A Cautionary Tale for Contempo-
rary Law and Psychiatry, 4 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 1, 2 (1981).
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id. at 2.
61. Rex v. Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 355 (1776). The earlier use of medical
testimony is consistent with the experience of Roman law in which medical testimony,
although not always physician testimony, was frequently received. Amundsen & Ferngren,
The Forensic Role of Physicians in Roman Law, 53 BULL. HIST. MED. 39, 39-56 (1979).
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Did attorneys assume that physicians could not or should not be com-
pelled to disclose confidential information? Although this question probably
cannot be resolved with any degree of certainty, the possibility that the legal
profession assumed it improper to compel disclosure of confidential physi-
cian-patient communications seems unlikely. In the sixteenth and seven-
teenth century the practice of medicine in England was foremost a trade, not
a profession of high calling.62 Practitioners of law thus would have been
unlikely to accord deferential treatment to most practitioners of medicine in
sixteenth and seventeenth century England either as a matter of class reci-
procity or professional respect.
Did English courts consider the question of a patient-physician privilege
prior to 1776 though no evidence of such consideration has been discovered?
The Duchess of Kingston's Case cites only one other case involving physician
testimony in support of its rejection of a physician-patient privilege. That
case, The Trial of Lawrence Earl Ferrers,63 was decided in 1760. Thomas
Kirkland, a surgeon, was called as a witness by the attorney general to testify
as to the wound received by the deceased as well as to statements made by
the defendant and the victim concerning the source of the wound. 64 No
objection to this testimony was made either by the defendant or sua sponte
by the court. Thus, the court made no ruling on the propriety of the sur-
geon's testimony. Blackstone's Commentaries, another source cited by the
court in the Duchess of Kingston's Case, discusses only the attorney-client
privilege, infamy, and interest as excuses that release a witness from the duty
to testify. 65 Thus, the question remains unanswered. In the absence of the
discovery of other cases, the most plausible theory for the lack of recorded
consideration of the patient-physician privilege is that attorneys assumed
that physicians could be compelled to disclose confidential communications
and, therefore, did not bother to litigate the question.
Dean Wigmore viewed the Duchess of Kingston decision rejecting the phy-
sician-patient privilege as an historical turning point in the analysis of privi-
62. Klein, supra note 55, at 375-77.
63. 19 How. St. Tr. 886 (1760).
64. Id. at 912-19.
65. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *370. Blackstone states:
All witnesses, that have the use of their reason, are to be received and examined,
except such as are infamous, or such as are interested in the event of the cause.
All others are competent witnesses; though the jury from other circumstances
will judge of their credibility. Infamous persons are such as may be challenged
as jurors, propter delictum; and therefore never shall be admitted to give evi-
dence to inform that jury, with whom they were too scandalous to associate.
Interested witnesses may be examined upon a voir dire, if suspected to be
secretly concerned in the event; or their interest may be proved in court. Which
last is the only method of supporting an objection to the former class; for no
man is to be examined to prove his own infamy. And no counsel, attorney, or
other person, intrusted with the secrets of the cause by the party himself, shall
be compelled, or perhaps allowed, to give evidence of such conversation or mat-
ters of privacy, as came to his knowledge by virtue of such trust and confidence:
but he may be examined as to mere matters of fact, as the execution of a deed or




lege.66 After this case, according to Wigmore, the courts imposed a
utilitarian test for privilege. Necessity, not honor, became the requirement
for recognition of a privilege. First, the justification for the attorney-client
privilege shifted to necessity. An acceptable showing of necessity required
proof that unless the privilege existed clients would not tell their attorneys
everything required for effective representation. 67 Next, recognition of a
physician-patient privilege was rejected as unnecessary because even in the
absence of a privilege courts believed that patients would tell their physicians
everything required for effective treatment. 68 Indeed, the courts acknowl-
edged that even necessity would not cause recognition of a privilege in all
cases:
In the first place, the principle protecting confidential communications
is of a very limited character. It does not protect all confidential com-
munications which a man must necessarily make in order to obtain ad-
vice, even when needed for the protection of his life, or of his honour, or
of his fortune. There are many communications which, though abso-
lutely necessary because without them the ordinary business of life can-
not be carried on, still are not privileged. The communications made to
a medical man whose advice is sought by a patient with respect to the
probable origin of the disease as to which he is consulted, and which
must necessarily be made in order to enable the medical man to advise
or to prescribe for the patient, are not protected. Communications
made to a priest in the confessional on matters perhaps considered by
the penitent to be more important even than his life or his fortune, are
not protected. . . . Therefore it must not be supposed that there is any
principle which says that every confidential communication which it is
necessary to make in order to carry on the ordinary business of life is
protected. 69
Courts in the United Kingdom have consistently refused to recognize a
66. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2286, at 531.
67. See id. § 2290, at 543.
68. See Wheeler v. LeMarchant, 17 Ch. D. 675, 681 (1881). A contemporary analysis of
the early cases sums up their approach:
And Lord Brougham in Greenhough v. Gaskell [1833] gives as the reason for the
privilege of legal advisers that it is out of regard to the interests of justice which
cannot be upholden, and to the administration of justice which cannot go on,
without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the courts, and
in those matters affecting rights and obligations which form the subject of all
judicial proceedings. If the privilege did not exist at all, everyone would be
thrown upon his own legal resources: deprived of all professional assistance, a
man would not venture to consult any skillful person, or would only dare to tell
his counsellor half his case.
Having regard to these considerations it is clear why the privilege, so called, is
not extended to medical advisers. They have nothing to do as such with the
administration of justice. The reason of the privilege in relation to legal advisers
does not extend to them. It is not absolutely necessary in the interests of justice
that inviolable secrecy should attach to all transactions between a man and his
medical adviser. The reason for the obligation of honour on the part of medical
advisers is not to enable the patient or party by whom they are consulted to
obtain justice according to law, but enable him to preserve that privacy in per-
sonal matters which every man is lawfully entitled to maintain.
Professional Confidences of Medical Men, 64 JUST. P. 241, 242 (1900).
69. Wheeler v. LeMarchant, 17 Ch. D. 675, 681 (1881).
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physician-patient privilege or any of its variants. 70 Legislative attempts to
abrogate the common law's refusal in the United Kingdom to recognize a
physician-patient privilege have also been rejected. 71 Although no privilege
70. R. CROSS, EVIDENCE 258 (4th ed. 1974); Brooke, Medicine, Pharmacy, Drugs and
Medicinal Products, HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 9 (Lord Hailsham ed. 1980).
71. LAW REFORM COMMITrEE (LONDON) PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS 20-22
(Sixteenth Report 1967) [hereinafter cited as LAW REFORM COMMITrEE]. Relevant portions
of their report are set forth below:
This [the physician-patient relationship] is another confidential relationship to
which no absolute privilege attaches but which, in practice, causes little diffi-
culty. The relationship of doctor and patient enables the doctor to obtain infor-
mation of two different kinds, i.e., information resulting from his clinical
observation of the patient (e.g. symptoms of venereal disease) and information
communicated by the patient to the doctor for the purpose of enabling him to
diagnose and prescribe. The justification for treating the first kind of informa-
tion as confidential is that it improves the health of the nation by encouraging
persons to seek medical advice and treatment. The justification for treating the
second kind of information as confidential is that candour on the part of the
patient is essential in order to determine the appropriate treatment for him. But
in the great majority of civil cases in which doctors are called as witnesses they
are called by the patient himself to give evidence of fact or opinion as to the
patient's condition ....
Personal injury cases are the commonest of those in which doctors are called
as witnesses; but there may be others in which justice cannot be done without a
doctor's disclosing information which he has obtained in the course of the doc-
tor-patient relationship. Medical negligence cases, issues as to the sanity or tes-
tamentary capacity of the patient and statements made to obtain life insurance
are examples. It is said, no doubt with justification, that successful psychiatric
treatment is dependent upon the utmost candour and confidence between doctor
and patient and that psychiatrists are the recipients of a wide variety of confi-
dences which might be relevant as admissions upon issues other than the health
of the patient. But we find it difficult to envisage situations which are not fanci-
ful in which a psychiatrist is likely to be called as a witness except on an issue as
to the mental or emotional state of a patient; and, since a psychiatric diagnosis
depends largely upon what the patient has told the psychiatrist, we find it im-
practicable to draw any line a priori between communications by the patient
which ought to be disclosed to enable the accuracy of the diagnosis to be tested
and those which it is unnecessary to disclose for this purpose.
These considerations have driven us to the conclusion that, where a doctor is
called, whether by the patient himself or by some other party, to give evidence
upon an issue as to the mental or physical condition of one of his patients, it is
impracticable to define in a statute the circumstances in which he should be
permitted to refuse to answer questions upon information obtained from the
patient as his medical adviser unless the patient consents to his doing so. The
propriety of allowing him to refuse must depend upon all the circumstances of
the case and is, we think, best left, as at present, to the judge. The way in which
judges have exercised that discretion in the past in civil cases has given little
ground for complaint from the medical profession and we think that they can be
relied on in the future to hold the balance fairly between the Hippocratic oath
and the witness's oath to tell the whole truth . ...
In arriving at the conclusion that no statutory privilege should be conferred
on communications made either to priests or doctors, we have been concerned
to avoid making recommendations inconsistent with such views as may be ex-
pressed by the Criminal Law Revision Committee. It is in criminal, rather than
in civil, proceedings that there is likely to arise any question of a priest or doctor
being compelled to reveal communications made to him in confidence by a peni-
tent or patient. For the reasons we have given, the issue is one of little practical
importance in civil proceedings, but it would be anomalous, and would imply a
false set of values, if we were to rate the secrecy of the confessional or the invio-
lability of the Hippocratic oath as more important than the ascertainment of the
1985]
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is recognized, the judge has broad discretion to allow witnesses to refuse to
disclose information if such disclosure would result in a breach of an ethical
or social duty and if disclosure is not required to effect justice in the particu-
lar case. 72 Judges have used this discretion in some cases to permit nondis-
closure of physician-patient communications.
73
Legislative abrogation of the common law has occurred in other countries
that derive their common law heritage from England. 74 In 1828 the State of
New York enacted the first physician-patient privilege statute in any com-
mon law jurisdiction.7" The revisers' notes reveal the rationale for that
statute:
In 4 Term Rep. 580, Buller J. (to whom no one will attribute a disposi-
tion to relax the rules of evidence,) said it was "much to be lamented"
that the information specified in this [statute] was not privileged. Mr.
Phillips expresses the same sentiments in his Treatice on Evidence, p.
104. The ground on which communications to counsel are privileged, is
the supposed necessity of a full knowledge of the facts, to advise cor-
rectly, and to prepare for the proper defence or prosecution of a suit.
But surely the necessity of consulting a medical adviser, when life itself
may be in jeopardy, is still stronger. And unless such consultations are
privileged, men will be incidentally punished by being obliged to suffer
the consequences of injuries without relief from the medical art, and
without conviction of any offense. Besides, in such cases, during the
struggle between legal duty on the one hand, and professional honor on
the other, the latter, aided by a strong sense of the injustice and inhu-
manity of the rule, will, in most cases, furnish a temptation to the per-
version or concealment of truth, too strong for human resistance.
76
The reference to Justice Buller's lamentation is from the case of Wilson v.
Rastall,77 a 1792 English decision of the King's Bench. Although that case
turned upon the attorney-client privilege, in particular whether the defend-
ant had consulted the attorney witness in his capacity as an attorney, Justice
truth about a crime, but not as important as the ascertainment of the truth about
a private wrong to an individual. However, we have been informed that, after a
thorough examination of these questions, the Criminal Law Revision Commit-
tee does not propose to recommend any change in the existing law. In this
respect, our own conclusions do not differ from theirs.
Id.
72. Id. at 3.
73. Id. at 22; see Mole v. Mole, [1950] 2 All E.R. 328, 329; McTaggart v. McTaggart,
[1948] 2 All E.R. 754, 755.
74. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
75. N.Y. REV. STAT. 1829 II, 406, part III, tit. 3, ch. VII, art. VIII, § 79. The original
statute provided:
No person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be compelled to
disclose any information which he may have acquired in attending any patient,
in a professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him
to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or to do any act for him, as a
surgeon.
Id.
76. Extracts from the Original Reports of the Revisers, REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK (1836) (emphasis in original); see also C. DEWIrT, supra note 13, at 15.
77. 100 Eng. Rep. 1283, 1287 (K.B. 1792).
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Buller's gratuitous observations on the physician-patient privilege were
noted and agreed with by the New York Legislature. Justice Buller stated:
There are cases, to which it is much to be lamented that the law of
privilege is not extended; those in which medical persons are obliged to
disclose the information which they acquire by attending in their pro-
fessional characters. This point was very much considered in The
Duchess of Kingston's Case, where Sir C. Hawkins, who had attended
the duchess as a medical person, made the objection himself, but was
over-ruled and compelled to give evidence against the prisoner. 7
The New York Medical Society's 1823 draft of A System of Medical Ethics
contains a reference to an American judicial recognition of a physician-pa-
tient privilege during the same period. The footnote reference contains no
case citation, but only the following statement: "The same principal was
recognized by a superior court of Pennsylvania in the year 1800, in the case
of a physician who refused to disclose his professional acts, against a defend-
ant, in a suit for divorce on the plea of adultery."'79 This reference to an
apparently unreported trial court decision is difficult to verify, but suggests
that, even in American jurisprudence, the New York statute was not written
on an empty slate.
Following the enactment of the New York statute a successful campaign
of legislative advocacy ensued. Currently, forty states and the District of
Columbia have a physician-patient privilege statute and, with the exception
of South Carolina and West Virginia, all states have either a physician-pa-
tient, psychiatrist-patient, psychologist-patient, or psychotherapist-patient
privilege. ° Similarly, other countries with a common law heritage, includ-
ing New Zealand,8' Victoria (Australia), 2 Israel, 3 Tasmania (Australia),84
Newfoundland, 5 and Honduras,8 6 have enacted physician-patient privi-
leges. On the other hand, Canada8 7 (with the exception of Quebec88), Aus-
tralia8 9 (with the exception of Tasmania and Victoria), and South Africa 90
have refused to recognize a physician-patient privilege.
78. Id. at 1287 (footnote omitted).
79. TRANSACTIONS OF THE MEDICAL SOCIETY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1807-31,
at 230, 242 (1868).
80. Shuman & Weiner, supra note 3, at 907 (table comparing availability of physician,
psychiatrist, psychologist, and psychotherapist privilege statutes in all 50 states as of 1982).
81. New Zealand Evidence Act 1908, § 8, reprinted in part in Finlay, Confidentiality of
Medical Disclosures Looking Ahead, 1975 NEW ZEALAND L.J. 80, 81.
82. Vict. Evidence Act 1958 S. 28 (as amended by Act 7418 (1966)).
83. Section 49 of the Israel Evidence Ordinance.
84. Tasm. Evidence Act of 1910, § 96, 2 TAS. STAT. (Reprinted 1959) as amended by
TASM. STAT. 1976, 1977.
85. Bernfeld, Medical Secrecy, 3 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 11, 14 (1972).
86. Id.
87. Dickens, Legal Protection of Psychiatric Confidentiality, 1 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
255, 260 (1978). Although Canada has refused any formal recognition of a physician-patient
privilege, case law indicates some support for a marital therapist privilege. See, e.g., Dembie v.
Dembie, 21 R.F.L. 46 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1976).
88. QUE. REV. STAT. ch. m-9, § 42 (1977); see Tollefson, Privileged Communications in
Canada (Common Law Provinces), 4 INT'L SYMP. ON COMP. L. 32, 44-45 (1967).
89. Bernfeld, supra note 85, at 14.
90. Zeffertt, Confidentiality and the Courts, 91 S. AFRICAN L.J. 432, 434-35 (1974).
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The debate over the physician-patient privilege in common law jurisdic-
tions typically centers on the utilitarian rationale for the privilege. 9 1 The
majority of commentators, including Wigmore, have concluded that the
physician-patient privilege cannot survive scrutiny under this approach.
92
Many legislatures, however, have indicated a different opinion.
93
Although the physician-patient privilege statutes in common law jurisdic-
tions vary greatly, they do have certain common characteristics. First, the
statutes apply only to judicially compelled disclosures. 94 Professional ethics,
rather than privilege statutes, govern noncompulsory, extrajudicial disclo-
sures. Second, the privilege belongs to the patient and may be waived by
him expressly or impliedly. 95 Third, the privilege is not absolute; exceptions
to the privilege vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, the priv-
ilege may not apply in criminal cases,9 6 personal injury cases,9 7 workers'
compensation proceedings, 98 will contests,99 child abuse proceedings, 1° ° or
when on balance the court finds that the need for the information outweighs
the value of confidentiality.' 0 ' When the privilege does apply in common
law jurisdictions, courts typically strictly construe and limit the privilege to
situations in which a person consults someone he reasonably believes to be a
physician. The consultation must be for the purpose of securing treatment
or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment, and the patient must communi-
cate information essential for treatment to the physician in a confidential
manner. 102
4. Civil Law
In contradistinction to the English common law, French civil law recog-
nizes a limitation on the power of courts to compel disclosure of confidential
physician-patient communications. This limitation in French law, and in the
law of other civil law continental European countries that recognize the
same rule,'0 3 is referred to as professional secret. Historians have traced the
91. See, e.g., LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, supra note 71, at 20-21.
92. See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2380a, at 818; C. DEWITT, supra note 13, at
34-36.
93. C. DEWTr, supra note 13, at 27-28.
94. Id. at 23.
95. Id. at 42-43.
96. E.g., People v. Arcega, 32 Cal. 3d 504, 523-26, 651 P.2d 338, 347-49, 186 Cal. Rptr.
94, 103-05 (1982); State v. Soney, 177 N.J. Super. 47, 424 A.2d 1182, 1188 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1980).
97. E.g., San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26, 27-29 (1951);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146f (West 1983); TEX. R. EvID 510(d)(5).
98. E.g., McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill. 2d 352, 423 N.E.2d 876, 884
(1981) (dissenting opinion); State v. Dayton Press, 11 Ohio St. 3d 66, 463 N.E.2d 1243, 1244-
45 (1984).
99. E.g., Gaynier v. Johnson, 673 S.W.2d 899, 903 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
100. E.g., People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 513, 668 P.2d 738, 743, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431,
536 (1983).
101. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (Supp. 1981); Section 49 of the Israel Evidence Ordi-
nance. The privilege does not apply when the "Court has found that the necessity to disclose
the evidence for the purpose of doing justice outweighs the interest in its non-disclosure." Id.
102. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 99, at 213 (1972).
103. For a list of such countries, see infra text accompanying notes 155-59.
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roots of the physician-patient professional secret in French law, le secret
m6dical, to the attorney-client privilege or professional secret in Roman
law. 1°4 When the territory now constituting France was incorporated into
the Roman Empire, Roman law, including the attorney-client privilege, be-
came the applicable law. 105 Subsequently, when the Teutons and other Ger-
manic tribes invaded France, Roman law was displaced, and all traces of
privilege or the professional secret disappeared for several centuries.106 The
Roman system was replaced with Germanic and Frankish procedures based
upon trial by battle or ordeal that did not require rules of evidence. 0 7
Ultimately, a combination of events fostered a rebirth of privilege or pro-
fessional secret. The efforts of the Church reintroduced Roman law to West-
ern Europe when extensive research by Gregorian monks led to the
discovery of the Roman Digest. 10 8 The attorney-client privilege contained
therein was then incorporated into the Decree of Gratian, 10 9 which served as
the foundation for the Corpus Juris Canonici, or Canon Law Code." I0 Ro-
man and Canon law, laden with the seed of professional secret, impregnated
the substantive and procedural aspects of French secular law through a pro-
cess of imitation and incorporation."'
Another factor that contributed to the recognition of a physician-patient
professional secret was the importation of medical science into the Western
Christian world by Jews during the eleventh and twelfth centuries." I2 This
importation, after centuries of regression in the field of medical science, oc-
curred first in Italy and then in France. Domat, the great French legal
scholar, traced the roots of the physician-patient professional secret to the
incorporation of the Hippocratic Oath in the Constitution of the old Paris
Medical School at the time of the rediscovery of medical science. 1 3 The
104. Digest, L 25, D. de Testibus, 22, 5, cited in A. ALLARD, HISTOIRE DE LA JUSTICE
CRIMINELLE § 137, at 253-55 (Gand 1868). "[N]e patroni in causa cui patrocinium praes-
titerunt, testimonium dicant." Id. at 253. The attorney-client and priest-penitent professional
secret in French law have been similarly traced. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text
for discussion of attorney-client privilege in Roman law.
105. See M. GIRAUD, ESSAI SUR L'HISTOIRE DU DROIT FRANIAIS AU MOYEN AGE,
Tome I, 15-35 (Paris 1846).
106. Id. at 35-44.
107. A. ESMEIN, HISTOIRE DE LA PROCPDURE CRIMINELLE EN FRANCE 46-47 (Paris
1882).
108. G. LE BRAS, L'Eglise Mddidvale au Service du Droit Romain in REVUE HISTORIQUE
DE DROIT FRANqAIS ET ETRANGER, Tome XLIV, 195 (4e S~rie 1966). A letter from Pope
John VIII in 814 A. D. hints that Roman law soon became one of the sources of canon law.
"Venerandae Romanae Leges Divinitum per ora Principum Promulgatae," Decret C., 16, Q.
3C. 17.
109. Decretum Gratiani, C.4, Q.2, C3 (Witnesses).
110. G. LE BRAS, supra note 108, at 195-96. This also gave formal recognition to the
absoluteness of the seal of confession.
111. See A. ALLARD, supra note 104, § 137, at 253-55; G. LE BRAS, supra note 108, at 197-
200; The Growth of the Competency and Influence of Canon Law Courts in the XIIth Century in
France, Due to the Marked Interest in Roman Law, and the Reinstatement by those Courts of
Roman Procedure, Including the Duty of Attorneys to Keep Professional Secrets, in H. BUTEAU,
L'ORDRE DES AVOCATS 104-06 (Paris 1895).
112. Mddecine, DICTIONNAIRE ENCYCLOPtDIQUE QUILLET 4154 (Paris 1975).
113. Art. 19 Appendicis ad Reformationem ein Facultatis Medicinae, in DOMAT, LES Lois
CIVILES, LE DROIT PUBLIC, Tome I, Livre 2, at 129, XIII (1777).
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climbing of the social ladder by the medical profession led to the profession's
political importance and conferral of privileges upon its members by the rul-
ing aristocracy.' 1 4
At the end of the Feudal Period both Roman and French customary
law 15 began to have a serious impact upon French secular law. Canon law
courts used Roman law to deal with both church and secular matters, and
such use slowly transformed French procedure, culminating in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries. In 1670 the "Ordonnance of 1670" established a
limitation on evidentiary sources and instituted the practice of hearing wit-
nesses in court. 116 The first traces of physician-patient professional secret
coincide chronologically with development of this new French procedure. 117
French customary law developed rules excluding certain relational com-
munications that were later extended to physicians. Borrowing heavily from
Roman and Canon law, the customary laws of some French provinces ac-
knowledged that breach of the seal of confession should not only be prohib-
ited, but also severely punished, because the confidences had been disclosed
to the priest as a representative of God. "8 French customary law also rec-
ognized a limitation on disclosure of attorney-client communications.' i9
The courts perceived these limitations on evidentiary sources as contrary to,
and less important than, the goal of discovering truth at trial and, therefore,
narrowly construed them.' 20 The development of professional secret in
France, against the background of Roman, Canon, and customary evidence
law, was slowed by the frantic desire to find truth, even through torture, by
the authoritative political system, and by the French monarchy.' 2'
By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, physicians joined priests and
attorneys in having a legal duty of confidentiality.' 22 Breach of that duty
gave rise to liability for damages resulting from the financial and social con-
sequences of the breach, but no criminal penalties were imposed.' 23 While
the duty of confidentiality did not translate exactly as a privilege, it did effect
a limitation on judicial disclosure. Early French case law allowed members
of some professions to ask the judge that he exempt them from testifying if
their testimony would reveal secrets learned in their professional practice.' 24
114. GUYOT, REPERTOIRE DE JURISPRUDENCE, Tome XI, 438-41 (Paris 1785).
115. French customary law refers to the territorial law of a given region as applied by the
controlling lord or monastery. R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW 4 (1972).
116. E. GLASSON, HISTOIRE DU DROIT ET DES INSTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE, Tome VI,
542 (Paris 1895).
117. 1858 D. Jur. 1,476. The first examples of privileges in the common law also coincided
with the change in common law procedures that allowed for the calling of witnesses to testify
at trial. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
118. Papon, Liv. 24, Tit. 7.
119. A. ALLARD, supra note 104, § 137, at 253-54.
120. Menochius, Praes, Lib. i, Q89.
121. May 1, 1899, Cass. civ., Fr., 1901 S. Jur. I, 162 n. § 1.
122. "Physicians, Surgeons and Pharmacists are forbidden to declare the secret ailments of
those whom they try to heal." FERRIERE, DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT ET PRATIQUE 93 (Paris
1769); see also GUYoT, supra note 114, at 439.




With respect to the medical profession, that exemption was based on the risk
of physician liability for damages upon breach of confidentiality 12 5 and on
the more general respect for professional secrets. Two theories were utilized
to warrant judicial recognition of these professional secrets. The first theory
postulated that the physician and patient were the bailee and bailor of
secrets. The second theory viewed physician and patient as parties to a con-
tract in which the physician promised to keep the patient's confidences.1 26
The struggle between the search for truth at trial and the confidentiality of
professional secrets continued, and a leading legal scholar of the time de-
scribed its status prior to the French Revolution in this manner:
One cannot compel an attorney or a physician to disclose the secrets
revealed to them by the client. . . . However there are some decisions
of the "Parlement de Paris" mandating lawyers to testify about privi-
lege matters, in light of the critical importance of their testimony in the
search for truth. Marnac says that the ancient case law held that attor-
neys and other professionals could not be ordered to disclose secrets
and confidences, but that now courts force them to do so; he adds that
the most illustrious legal experts tried their hardest to keep the old posi-
tion alive, but failed in their endeavor.1 27
Ultimately this seesaw led to the passage of article 378 of the French Pe-
nal Code of 1810, which recognized professional secret and imposed crimi-
nal penalties for its violation.
Physicians, surgeons and other health officials, as well as pharma-
cists, nurses, and all other persons "bailees of secrets and confidences
communicated" to them because of their status or profession, who will
reveal those secrets, in all instances other than when the law compels
them to disclose, will be punished with a term of no less than one
month and no more than six months of imprisonment and a fine of no
less than 10.00 and no more than 100.00 francs. 128
Legislative history reveals the original rationale for this article:
Should we not consider that disclosure of privileged information is a
serious offense because-it shatters the reputation of the patient whose
125. Id. French case law dating from the sixteenth century recognized a duty of confiden-
tiality upon the physician. 1854 D. Jur. I, 27, § 82, § 83. The moral duty of the Hippocratic
Oath was transferred into a legal duty for which the patient might bring action for damages
when the disclosure was malicious. 1858 D. Jur. I, 476-77. For example, in 1599 the Chambre
de la Tournelle rendered a judgment against a pharmacist who disclosed a patient's loathesome
disease because the patient defaulted in paying the bill. Id. The duty not to disclose is evi-
denced in part by a 1666 edict that required physicians to reveal to municipal authorities
treatment given to injured patients so that the authorities could track down criminal activities.
Id. at 476, § 4. Although unenforced due to its unpopularity, the edict is a response to the
duty of secrecy.
126. C. PtN. ANNOT. art. 139.
127. SERPILLAN, CODE CRIMINEL, Ire partie, 447 (Lyon 1767).
128. 1858 D. Jur. I, 477. Originally article 378 was categorized as a defamatory crime, and
only slanderous disclosures were punishable. Thus, for example, a physician who attended a
birth and thereby discovered evidence of an earlier abortion was liable for disclosure only if the
patient enjoyed a good reputation. This interpretation of the professional secret codified in
article 378 was abandoned toward the second half of the nineteenth century. Id. at 477-78.
Article 378 did not work a radical change in existing law, but was instead built upon existing
law. PERRAUD-CHARMANTIER, LE SECRET PROFESSIONNEL 35-39, 55-64, Parts (1926).
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secret is betrayed-it destroys the patient's confidence in the physician,
since this confidence has become more harmful than useful-it causes
people to choose silence and mental or physical suffering rather than
benefiting from educated persons' help--it portrays professionals,
whose image should be one of therapists, counselors and men looking
for the patient's best interest, as traitors?
This provision is a novelty in our legal system. We would have wished
that ethical considerations and tact would cause it to be useless. But
how many times do we not see professionals, to whom secrets have been
entrusted, sacrify their duty on the altar of caustic humor, kid about the
gravest matters, keep malice alive with indecent revelations, obscene
stories, and bring shame and sorrow upon the patients and their
families? 129
The underlying concern expressed is protection of the patient's reputation in
the community from the perceived danger of indiscreet physicians.' 30 In
early 19th century France a person's reputation seriously affected his em-
ployment, friendship, marriage, and social status. Disclosure of conditions
such as venereal disease or organic malfunction was, therefore, a serious
evil. 131
Since enactment of article 378, commentators have advanced additional,
albeit overlapping, rationales to support the professional secret. One such
rationale is that revelation of confidences disrupts the "social order."' 3 2 For
example, revelation that a patient suffers from a communicable or geneti-
cally transmitted disease might disturb the peace of the patient's family, re-
sult in societal rejection of the patient, and thereby result in a weakening of
the social fabric.
Another justification advanced for the professional secret is the right of
privacy.' 3 3 According. to the privacy rationale, the state's intrusion upon
highly personal, health-related aspects of a citizen's private domain is simply
wrong. Particularly during troubled political times, arbitrary disclosure of
patient information threatens the right to privacy.13 4
Still another rationale advanced for the professional secret is that the phy-
sician is the trustee by necessity of the patient's secrets.' 35 Proponents of
this theory maintain that trust is conducive to the patient's seeking and re-
ceiving treatment. Thus, the patient must be assured that his confidences
will be kept. A disclosure of confidential information would forfeit the pa-
tient's confidence in the physician, breach the physician's duty as trustee by
necessity, and cause people with embarrassing diseases not to seek
treatment. 13
6
129. LOCRE, LA LGiSLATION CIVILE, COMMERCIALE ET CRIMINELLE DE LA FRANCE,
Tome XV, Code Civil, Livre III, 445.
130. R. FLORIOT ET R. COMBALDIEU, LE SECRET PROFESSIONNEL 17-18 (1973).
131. Id. at 18.
132. Id. at 42-43.
133. Id. at 7.
134. Id. at 72.




Because the initial rationale for the professional secret was the protection
of patients' reputations from small talk at social events, the draftsmen of
article 378 focused upon garrulous physician behavior rather than judicially
compelled testimony. Much confusion has thereby resulted in article 378's
relation to the legal system. One major ongoing question is whether article
378 is absolute. Can the professional secret be waived? Does it permit excep-
tions? Proponents of an absolute professional secret contend that the drafts-
men designed the duty of professional secret to protect not only individual
patients but also the larger interest of the community. 137 If disclosure is
permitted, other members of the community may hesitate to make disclo-
sures to their physicians.13 8 Thus, the professional secret is not simply a
right belonging to the patient that he may waive at his discretion. Rather,
the professional secret is a protection of the entire community and is, there-
fore, beyond the capacity of any individual patient to waive.
French law does not permit the consent of the victim to alter the character
of a criminal offense. 139 The victim may not alter the policy of the criminal
laws and society's power to punish violations. By analogy to this position at
criminal law, absolutists argue that the patient may not waive or consent to a
violation of professional secret because the patient may neither abrogate the
policy underlying the secret nor limit society's power to punish violations. 14
Those who oppose the absolute view argue that the professional secret is
designed to protect the interests of individual patients. Patients should thus
be permitted to determine whether waiver will protect or hinder their indi-
vidual interests. 141 Proponents of this position argue that waiver by one in-
dividual patient will not deter another patient from seeking help since each
individual realizes that waiver is his choice to make.
Although the absolute view of the secret prevailed initially, that
supremacy has been tempered over time. 142 Only the criminal chamber of
the French high court, the Cour de Cassation, has adhered to the concept of
the absolute professional secret. 143 According to its decisions, the patient
137. "[I]f we examine the foundations of the duty of professional secrecy we find that the
interests of the community are considered just as important as the individual's need for pri-
vacy." PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 59 (A. Robertson ed. 1973) (quoting NERSON, JOUR-
NAL DES TRIBUNAUX 157 (1959)).
138. J. B. DE LA GRESSAYE, SECRET PROFESSIONNEL, REPERTOIRE DE DROIT PENAL ET
DE PROCtDURE PENALE, Tome IV (Dalloz, Paris 1977).
139. Id.
140. D. THOUVENIN, LE SECRET MDICAL ET L'INFORMATION DU MALADE 98 (1982).
141. Id.
142. Honorat & Melennec, Vers Une Relativisation du Secret Mddical, 1979 J.C.P. I No.
2936, 1.
143. Id. No. 2936, AA 18-20. A 1966 decision of the French Cour de Cassation is illustra-
tive. Dame Burdier, Dec. 22, 1966, Cass. crim., 1967 J.C.P. II No. 15126. The defendant was
charged with murdering her lover and cutting his body into little pieces. She attempted to call
her personal physician to testify on her behalf, but was refused the opportunity based upon the
absolute nature of the professional secret. Over a dissenting opinion, the majority of the court
reasoned that patient trust requires that the secret be absolute and beyond the capacity of the
patient, physician, or judge to waive.
A Canadian law professor, Jack London, described a rape trial he observed in the south of
France. The defense alleged was consent. The accused sought to present the testimony of a
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may not waive the secret's application even when the physician's disclosure
would be exculpatory. Even in criminal cases, however, a gradual loosening
of the absolute position may be occurring. 144
Conversely, the civil chamber of the Cour de Cassation has espoused a
nonabsolute view of professional secret.145 That court has permitted waiver
of the secret when waiver would serve the patient's best interests. Such situ-
ations include cases in which waiver of the secret is necessary to obtain testi-
mony that supports a claim for disability benefits or explains a party's
unavailability at trial. 146 Similarly, the civil court has permitted waiver
when it would serve the interests of the patient's family, for example, to
support a challenge to the mental capacity of the author of a will. 147 The
court has also permitted an implied waiver of the secret to serve the public
order, for example, to assist the physician to defend a medical malpractice
claim 148 or to allow testimony that a patient poses a serious danger to third
persons. 149
Article 378's protections apply both to information that a patient volunta-
rily reveals to a physician acting in a professional capacity and to informa-
tion discovered or involuntarily revealed, sometimes called secrets by
nature. 150 The earlier view was that the secret covered only information
prejudicial to the patient. 151 This view, however, has been abandoned and
the professional secret now covers disclosure of nonprejudicial information
as well. 152 A violation of the professional secret statute occurs whether the
physician discloses the confidential information to the general public or
merely to a single person. 153 Furthermore, although violation of the profes-
sional secret initially required malicious conduct, that requirement has been
nurse that shortly after the alleged rape, contrary to the victims' testimony, the two alleged
victims were "in good spirits and sound physical condition." When the nurse was informed
that her testimony, even with the patient-victim's consent, would constitute a violation of pro-
fessional secrecy cognizable under the criminal law, she refused to testify. The defendants
were convicted. London, Privacy in the Medical Context, in ASPECTS OF PRIVACY LAW 281,
282 (D. Gibson ed. 1980).
144. For example, a physician may defend himself on a charge of fraud by testifying to the
patient's deceptive conduct that led to the alleged fraud. Dec. 20, 1967, Cass. crim., 1969 D.
Jur. 309; see D. THOUVENIN; supra note 140, at 100.
145. Honorat & Melennec, supra note 142, 23.
146. Id.
147. Id. The deceased patient's survivors will not always be permitted to waive the privi-
lege for the benefit of the patient. In a paternity action against the estate following the death of
the alleged father, the alleged father's mother was not permitted to introduce a physician's
statement that the deceased was sterile as the result of a prostatectomy. Dame D. . . c Dlle,
Oct. 13, 1970, Cass civ. lre, Fr., 1970 S. Jur. I, 765. The court reasoned that while normally
an exception to professional secret will be found in the case of necessity (e.g., sanity of testator
at time will drafted), when, as in the case at bar, the information was not offered by the patient
and was information of an embarrassing condition that the patient had sought to hide, no
exception would be permitted.
148. Honorat & Melennec, supra note 142, 22.
149. Slachmuylder, Secret professionnel etprotection de la jeunesse, Journal des Tribunaux,
Oct. 7, 1967, at 529-32.






replaced by a requirement of intentional conduct. Negligent conduct, how-
ever, remains insufficient to trigger a violation of article 378.154
The professional secret statutes of other civil law countries are not abso-
lute. For example, Germany,15 5 Switzerland, 156 Italy, 157 Belgium, 158 and
Portugal 159 require a complaint from the patient to initiate prosecution. In
addition, Italy and Portugal permit an exception to the secret when required
by the public interest.
5. Comparison and Summary
The difference between the common law privilege and the civil law profes-
sional secret is not merely semantic. Professional secret has a much broader
application; it applies to the professional both in court and out of court.
Common law jurisdictions leave extrajudicial disclosures to the realm of pro-
fessional ethics and not to the realm of privilege. Professional secret, how-
ever, combines the common law concept of privilege with professional
ethics, and thus establishes a criminal sanction for the violation of either.
Professional secret protects a greater fund of patient information. Privi-
lege protects only information that the patient communicates to the physi-
cian; professional secret protects not only that information communicated
by the patient but information communicated by other sources as well.
Moreover, while common law courts require a close nexus between the privi-
leged communication and the treatment, civil law courts permit greater lati-
tude on this question.
Common law jurisdictions always permit a voluntary waiver of the privi-
lege by the patient, viewing it as any other individual right subject to waiver.
Civil law jurisdictions do not always permit a voluntary waiver of the profes-
sional secret by the patient, often viewing it as a societal right rather than
merely an individual right. Furthermore, although the rationales advanced
for the physician-patient privilege and professional secret tend to overlap,
the privilege tends to rely more heavily on the utilitarian rationale while the
professional secret tends to rely more heavily on the deontological rationale.
Many differences in civil and common law procedures are explained be-
cause the civil and common law systems differ in both the use of the inquisi-
torial or adversarial system and the use or nonuse of the jury. 16° Hearsay
154. Id. A recent example of cognizable violation occurred in a case in which a physician
consultant for an insurance company obtained access to the insured's hospital records and
disclosed to the insurance company that the patient suffered from a terminal disease and had a
very limited life expectancy at the time of the accident. Docteur B .. , May 17, 1973, Cass.
crim., 1974 J.C.P. II No. 17712. The Cour de Cassation affirmed a judgment finding that the
physician violated the professional secret since he knew he was disclosing confidential informa-
tion acquired in a professional capacity even though the information was obtained from a
source other than the patient. Id.
155. German Penal Code of 1871, art. 300 (1961).
156. Swiss Penal Code art. 321.
157. Italian Penal Code art. 622 (1978).
158. Belgian Penal Code art. 458 (1810).
159. Decree Law 32,171, July 29, 1942, art. 7 (Portugal).
160. Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure:
A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 507 (1973).
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evidence, for example, is freely admitted in civil law countries where juries
are rarely used. Common law countries, however, limit the admissibility of
hearsay because of a fear that juries will not properly evaluate it. The dis-
tinction between privilege and professional secret, however, does not turn on
these procedural differences. Unlike hearsay in a common law jurisdiction,
evidence of a confidential communication is not excluded because the jury
may accord it too much weight or be misled by it. Confidential communica-
tions may be extremely probative and unambiguous. Rather, confidential
communications are excluded because the evil sought to be avoided is expo-
sure to any unintended third party, judge or jury, in any context, adversarial
or inquisitorial. Thus, nothing inherent in the civil and common law sys-
tems explains their different approaches to this problem.
Common and civil law systems wrestle with the same tension between
accurate fact-finding and confidential communications. Despite their shared
Roman law ancestry, the common and civil law approaches to this tension,
as reflected in the statutes and cases that describe their laws, differ widely.
But do these laws accurately reflect existing practice? For example, despite
the lack of a formal physician-patient privilege, does the English jurist's use
of discretion to permit a refusal to disclose information yield a de facto privi-
lege? Do the systems differ as radically in practice as they do on paper?
That is a subject for another day.
II. CONCLUSION
Privilege and professional secret rules limiting intrusion into certain rela-
tionships did not, until the late eighteenth century, rest upon a utilitarian
rationale. The earliest of these rules, the attorney-client privilege in Roman
and English law and the priest-penitent privilege in French law, were based
on a deontological rationale that compulsory disclosure of these confidences
is morally wrong and society ought not to intrude into these relationships.
A shift in favor of the utilitarian rationale for privilege and professional
secret rules accompanied the shift in the rationale for confidentiality in ex-
trajudicial situations in the early nineteenth century. Although effective lob-
bying has convinced many legislators of the need for privilege and
professional secret rules based upon a utilitarian rationale, no serious empiri-
cal studies justify the utility of these rules. Particularly in the area of the
physician-patient relationship ample reasons exist to question the utilitarian
basis for a privilege or professional secret. The dubiousness of the utilitarian
rationale does not, however, yield the conclusion that a physician-patient
privilege or professional secret should be rejected. Instead it requires serious
analysis under a different rationale.
The deontological rationale for the physician-patient privilege or profes-
sional secret is enticing, yet it requires further examination. What values are
protected by this privilege or professional secret and why? Does one set of
values prevail in all situations? What changes, if any, should attend a de-
ontologically based privilege or professional secret? Should the privilege or
secret be absolute or should exceptions be permitted? If exceptions should be
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permitted would they be the same exceptions currently recognized? Need
those exceptions be articulated in advance of trial by the legislature or can
they be determined at trial by the judge or jury when the competing values
are brought into focus? Much work remains to be done.

